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Critical geography in post-modern times 
Huib Ernste
Introduction
Many young academics, having their first research experiences in the field of 
human geography, often struggle with finding a suitable theoretic framework for 
their research. One part of this struggle is the ambition to make their research 
matter in a practical, societal context (Massey, 1984). How can one derive 
practically and politically relevant conclusions from one’s own research? From 
this perspective, it often does not seem to be enough to just understand current 
practices. It is also felt as a necessity to make some kind of recommendations for 
change to create a better future, or at least have the feeling that one’s research 
leads to something. This ambition is usually deeply rooted in the motivational 
structure of human geographers, even if they are not always very explicit about 
it. Human geographers, somehow, tend to want to improve the world, to put their 
understanding of the world to some use. It is therefore also no coincidence that 
human geography has always been closely linked to different realms of applied 
science. This has always been a very strong tradition in geography, especially in 
the Netherlands1. On the one hand, this practical ambition can be associated with 
a critical stance towards existing societal practices. This critical attitude is also 
the basis of what is called ‘critical geography’ (Bauder and Engel-Di Mauro, 
20082). On the other hand, the close relationship between applied research and 
powerful external principals, is sometimes also seen as direct threat for a free 
critical attitude in research (Fuller and Kitchin, 2004). 
Another part of the struggle of finding a suitable theoretical framework is 
linked with the multitude of different theoretical approaches one can choose 
from, and the lack of own experience with most of them. In recent times it has 
often been claimed that there are no dominant research paradigms anymore 
(Feyerabend, 1975), that we live in a multi-paradigmatic world (Weichhart, 
2000) and that we lack specific criteria on how to choose a suitable approach for 
one’s own research. Increasingly theoretic approaches are irrational scientific 
fads rather than that they are reflected and deliberate choices. As fashions they 
are the children of their times (Peet, 1998). In the current ‘postmodern’ times this 
seems to be more so than ever before. Under these circumstances many young 
scholars choose their specific theoretical approach on the basis of the 
(unreflected) inspiration they get from these approaches or the social acceptance 
they can gain from it. And who would blame them? Only if one experiences the 
changes of time, and the related changes in fashions and approaches one can 
seriously look back and consciously reflect on the specific differences and 
                                                          
1 For a more historic overview of the development and different approaches in Dutch human 
geography see also (Ernste, forthcoming). 
2 See also: ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies: www.acme-journal.org
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similarities between these approaches and on the historical contingencies of their 
fate.
From this perspective, I briefly would like to reflect, in this contribution, on 
how to be critical and how to make human geography matter in the current, 
postmodern times. I will roughly follow the development of critical geography 
from its early beginnings to its current state in postmodern times, and loosely 
add my personal reflective comments and questions to it. Finally I will derive 
some personal conclusions on how it is possible to be constructively critical 
today and in the future. Maybe this can even serve as source of inspiration for 
young scholars searching for their theoretical position on the research questions 
they face. 
The origins of critical thinking 
In the 1970s, two new approaches, behavioural geography and humanistic 
geography, of which the latter subsequently formed the basis of the action-
theoretical approach in human geography (Werlen, 1992), emerged as a direct 
critique of the spatial analysis approach which was developed in the years 
before. Spatial analysis was inspired by a positivist and empiricist approach in 
human geography and focussed on the explanation and representation in 
quantitative models of aggregate patterns in space and in spatial interaction. 
Spatial analysis, as such, is largely abstracted from individual human behaviour 
and human actions which might play a role behind these spatial patterns. Both 
behavioural geography and action-theoretic geography gave primacy to human 
agency - although each in a different way - rather than to aggregate patterns of 
flows and human activities. The first adhered to the positivist approach but 
focussed on individual human behaviour and the cognitive information 
processing mechanism behind it. The spatial situation in which people behave 
was still seen as the main stimulus for and the main structural force behind 
spatial human behaviour. The second, however, was much more inspired by 
phenomenological and existential philosophy and assumed the origin of spatial 
human action and experience in human intentionality, instead of only in the 
situation. In this view the individual human being is perceived as a self-directing, 
creative force. For the action theoretic approach in human geography, society 
and all its spatial patterns is the sum of individual decisions and choices. 
Soon both behavioural and humanistic geography were criticised, from a more 
structuralist perspective because they supposedly failed to take into account the 
material context in which human actions took place. Structuralism in general 
claimed that individual activities could only be understood with reference to 
impersonal social forces and to rules and logic of (hidden) social structures in 
society. Within the social sciences this structuralist approach found its origin in 
the work of Durkheim, Comte, Montesquieu, Althusser, Lévy Strauss and 
foremost in the work of the (Swiss) linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1966)3. It 
3 Saussure claimed that, at that time, the conventional view of language as a neutral medium for 
representing the world was wrong. Traditionally the meaning of a word was determined by the 
relation this word had to a specific concept in human mind, which in turn would derive its meaning 
from the correspondence to the existence of an object in the real world. In contrast Saussure 
conceptualised language as a complex system of signs whose meanings lie in the arbitrary 
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aimed to discover the universal laws that govern the functioning of social forms 
and which are founded in unconscious mental structures. It was proposed, that 
‘underlying the social surface, with its seeming contingency, randomness, and 
individual freedom, are universal structures that operate independently of 
individual will to create order and social coherence. Indeed, the self or individual 
is, in this perspective, little more than a vehicle for the unconscious structural 
codes to enact their logic’ (Seidman, 1998, p. 218). 
It is often forgotten, that these intellectual perspectives also have a history and 
a geography of themselves (Blomley, 2008). In this case, for example, the 
structuralist movement is strongly rooted in the French context. Parallel to a 
nationally centralised government and power structure, the French intellectual 
culture is also centred around a few great universities and research centres led by 
dominant general ‘patron-scholars’, as Seidman (1998, p.214) calls them, who 
are expected to draw on a broad (disciplinary overarching) scientific body of 
knowledge in order to engage in social and political developments. Intellectual 
debates in the French culture have, therefore, always been strongly politicised 
and focussed on the cultural conflict between a more humanistic and structuralist 
world view. The typical French focus on the structuralised aspects of daily life 
can be understood from its specific French institutional context. Even the short 
upturn of humanistic and existentialist approaches in the after WWII, inspired by 
the war resistance movement, can be explained as the reconstruction of national 
pride and structural power (Kurzweil, 1980). Structuralism gave expression to a 
particular French view of the world at that time. General de Gaulle promised 
neither reform nor revolution but rather a stable growth-oriented society 
focussed on rebuilding the economy and national culture. In addition, the 
emerging super-powers of the United States and the Soviet Union seemed to 
offer few possibilities beyond manoeuvring within a fixed structural framework. 
‘With the heroic spirit of existentialism dimming and with the revelations of the 
horrors of Stalinism dampening the ideological [and revolutionary (HE)] vigour 
of the French Communist Party, structuralism took central stage’ (Seidman, 
1998, p. 219). 
Without taking into account the implicit historical and geographical 
contingencies of this kind of thinking, in practice, geography picked up several 
ideas from a wide variety of these structural thinkers. Foremost, the historical 
materialist thinkers - Marx, Althusser and Lefebvre - played an important role. 
They proposed that the world can only be understood with reference to the 
historically unfolding political and economic relations that structure social life. 
Accordingly, the world is shaped by deep structures of capitalism in which class 
relations reproduce and sustain people’s behaviour and are the driving forces of 
history. Short (Hubbard et al., 2002, p. 44): the prevailing mode of production of 
material life [the (economic) structural base, HE] determines the general 
relationship between different signs. So words and concepts get their meaning in the particular ways 
in which they differ from other words and concepts in a specific language system. Meanings are thus 
not fixed but based on social constructions and conventions about these relationships. The meaning 
of the word ‘man’ is, for example, not determined by any intrinsic properties that summon up the 
concept, but rather because it contrasts to the way the word ‘woman’ is used. Thus, language systems 
are dynamic, social structures which shape our thinking, our saying and our doing. From this 
structural point of view, society can be seen as a kind of super-language (Seidman, 1998, pp. 216-
218). 
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character of the social, cultural, political and other processes of life [the 
(cultural) superstructure, HE]. Thus Marx thought that it is not people’s 
consciousness that determine their being but, on the contrary, the social-
economic being that determines their consciousness. ‘For Marx, there is no such 
thing as an individual human nature – the kind of person one is and the kind of 
things one does are determined by the kind of society in which one lives. This 
theory is inherently teleological, in the sense that it sees events as stages in the 
movement towards a preordained (and socially just) future, and functional in the 
sense that it subsumes the individual to the logic of the capitalist system’. This 
capitalist system was based on the unequal (power) relations between the 
bourgeois owners of the means of production and the exploited proletariat. On 
the one hand, the class of labourers was responsible for creating the added 
wealth, or surplus value, through their labour. On the other hand, this crucial 
contribution also put them in a position to collectively bring down the capitalist 
system and make it inherently unstable. These kind of class differences also had 
a clear spatial aspect, separating the elite from the exploited and making 
capitalism into an imperialist enterprise securing the continuing supply of cheap 
labour (Harvey, 1982; Castree, 1999). 
By the identification of class differences and the inherent alienation of the 
labourers as a driving force of modern capitalism, Marxist inspired structuralism 
also contains a clear humanist and critical thrust. It defined human beings as 
structurally seeking liberation from alienating labour conditions and striving 
towards developing and unfolding human capacities and creative potentials 
(Ollman, 1976). As such, structural Marxism focussed on the emancipation of 
the proletariat and on a critique of existing capitalist structures. But at the same 
time, it also assumed capitalist structures and the way towards full emancipation 
as pre-given and following an ‘iron law’: 
 ‘History is an immense natural-human system in movement, and the motor of history 
is class struggle. History is a process, and a process without a subject. The question 
about how “man makes history” disappears altogether. Marxist theory rejects it 
once and for all; it sends it back to its birthplace: bourgeois ideology4’ (Althusser, 
1976, pp. 83-84, quoted in Peet, 1998, p. 123). 
Or as Kevin Cox (2005, p. 21) paraphrased Karl Marx: ‘People make history, but 
not under conditions of their own choosing’. 
Critical theory and critical geography 
Critical theory, in general, and critical geography, in particular, were formulated 
in the early 1970s as a direct response to structural theories of those days. 
‘Critical theory as developed by the original Frankfurt School attempted to 
explain why the socialist revolution prophesied in the mid-nineteenth century by 
Marx did not occur as expected’ (Agger, 1991, p. 107). Representatives of the 
Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, such as Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, 
tried to develop a new understanding of capitalism which would take into 
4 The term ‘ideology’ as used here resembles the currently more fashionable term ‘discourse’ in the 
sense that it is seen as a system of ideas and representations and a system of meanings that dominate 
people’s minds, their thinking and doing. 
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account the transformed situation in the emerging twentieth century 
(Horkheimer, 1972). They thought that capitalism was developing coping 
mechanisms, against its own contradictory powers and against a possible 
proletarian uprising, thus continuing and reinforcing its domination in modern 
society. In their eyes, this domination was based on a combination of external 
exploitation and internal self-disciplining of the labour class. People internalise 
certain values and norms that induce them to participate effectively in the 
capitalist system. More concretely, people believe that they can achieve modest 
individual improvement in their situation by complying with certain social 
norms, which, at the same time, make more structural social changes less 
probable. They thus exchange their substantive interests in liberation of 
exploitative relations for the freedoms of consumer choice. In today’s terms if 
people can enjoy the purchase of the newest iPhone and cheap flight to the 
Maldives, they will continue to play their role in the capitalist system. The 
critical school thus identified a number of cultural, political and ideological 
mechanisms which stabilised and even deepened the dominance of the capitalist 
system. They held the combination of the enlightenment ideology with the 
positivist ideology particularly responsible for this increasing dominance by the 
system (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972). While enlightenment helped to 
demystify the structural powers of religion and mythology, it also made the 
positivist science into a new mythology and ideology in the sense that through 
this new ‘religion’ people everywhere are taught to accept the world ‘as it is’, as 
a quasi objective scientific fact, instead of what it could be. Positivism suggested 
that one can perceive the world without questioning the assumptions about the 
phenomena under observation and thus that knowledge simply represents the 
world as it is. Positivist thinking leads to an uncritical identification of reality 
and rationality, and to the inability to view the world in terms of its potential for 
being changed, beyond simplistic and reduced patterns and cause-and-effect 
relationships (Jay, 1973). Even Marxist theory, in the eyes of the Frankfurt 
School, was, in that sense, too positivist and too reductionist and failed ‘to secure 
an adequate ground in voluntarism, instead falling back on the fatalism of 
positivist determinism’ (Agger, 1991, p. 110). In contrast to structural Marxism, 
the Frankfurt School concluded that human beings make their own history, 
instead of being exclusively subjectified by the structural capitalist mode of 
production. 
A further important step forward was made by the second generation Frankfurt 
School critical thinker Jürgen Habermas (1984) who tried to reconstruct critical 
theory to find a better balance between the (positivist) knowledge gained from 
causal analysis and knowledge gained from critical self-reflection. He 
acknowledged that next to the anthropologically deep seated technical interests 
in domination of nature and the material reproduction other practical interests 
also play an important role in any human practice (Peet, 1998, p. 92), namely 
socio-cultural reproduction, especially through the mechanism of intersubjective 
understanding5. He thus conceptualised the process of rationalisation in a much 
broader way, comprising not only technical-instrumental, but also moral-
practical and aesthetic-expressive dimensions of rationalisation. Rationality, 
conceived in this way, would then also bear the potential for critical reflection 
5 As I have shown elsewhere, it can be argued that these additional aspects of human practice are also 
firmly anthropologically rooted (Ernste, 2004). 
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and would also enhance and extend the project of modernity, towards a better 
future. In his theory of communicative rationality, making use of theory of 
speech acts, he also detailed the ideal-typical but contra-factual societal 
mechanisms of communicative rationalisation of these different kinds of 
knowledge6. In doing so, he shifted the focus of critical theory, from a more 
substantive and essentialistic view on differences within society to a more 
procedural view on the mechanisms to criticise and reconcile these differences 
(Zierhofer, 2002). Habermas thus shifts critical social theory from the paradigm 
of consciousness to the paradigm of communication, as in all Western 
philosophy, enabling workable strategies of ideology-critique, community 
building and social-movement formation (Agger, 1991, p. 110). The task of 
critical theory then is to critically look at the real processes, and explain why and 
how they divert from the communicative rational ideal and criticise them from 
this procedural point of view. In this way Habermas did not only offer a broad 
theory of society, but also a vision of a good society and a template for 
constructive critique of oppressive practices. Nevertheless, no specific societal 
classes or positions are privileged in Habermas’ critical theory and the historical 
and geographical contextuality of the different frames of knowledge are 
recognised.
Again, we can notice that the critical theory of the Frankfurt school is closely 
related to the historical and geographical conditions in Germany. Their focus on 
the human agency, instead of on societal structures, can be traced back to 
German idealism and (neo-)Kantian traditions (Therborn, 1978, pp. 88-89), but, 
especially for the second generation Frankfurt School scholars, such as Karl-Otto 
Apel and Jürgen Habermas is also rooted in the catastrophic experience of the 
Second World War in Germany, which made clear that, in the interest of 
humanitarian values, there is and must be space for critical resistance against the 
overwhelming power of fascist political institutions (Reese-Schaefer, 1990). In 
the face of these experiences it is almost seen as ethically reprehensible and 
irresponsible to assume the ‘death of the subject’ and, on the contrary, a moral 
obligation to search for ways through which a better world could be created 
peacefully. At this point the scholars of the Frankfurt School continued to rely on 
the central idea of ‘rationality’ as formulated and identified as a core concept in 
the capitalist system by Max Weber (1978, 1958) in a German idealist fashion. 
Taking this contextuality into account, one could of course ask in how far these 
theoretical viewpoints – the French structuralism and the German idealism – 
although formulated as universal grand narratives, should not instead be valued 
from their respective contexts as small and local narratives. ‘To be “critical” 
means different things in different places’ (Blomley, 2008, p. 290). 
With Jürgen Habermas’ non-essentialistic critical theory, a step was also made 
in the direction of what Joe Painter (2000) designates as a more pluralistic 
critical human geography, which shares not only the interests of Marxist 
geography in relations of inequality and oppression, but also includes many other 
6 It is important here to acknowledge that Jürgen Habermas never assumed that this communicative 
rational ideal actually existed. He only noticed that empirically, human beings to a certain degree in 
their inter-actions, always assume this communicative rational ideal while in reality many disturbing 
factors occur. This ideal-typical framework, however, makes it possible to reflect critically on this 
real situation and to identify the real causes of systemic domination of the one-sided technical and 
economic rationality in capitalistic societies. 
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kinds of oppression, which do not need to be of a material nature (Cox, 2005, p. 
6). In general, one could characterise critical geography as the endeavour not just 
to understand the world from a geographical perspective, but to also change it by 
combining science and politics7. This kind of critical geography is often 
differentiated from applied forms of geography that uncritically serve the 
interests of the state or business (Fuller and Kitchin, 2004, p. 5; Pain, 2006, p. 
253). The emergence of these critical approaches is closely related to the 
political and social changes that occurred at that time. The post-war social calm 
abruptly came to an end in Paris in May 1968 when student revolts ignited a 
sweeping cultural shift, in which moderate democratisations of traditional 
institutions did not suffice anymore. It was a general revolt against any kind of 
authority. A totally different kind of society was demanded. This was not limited 
to universities and students were soon also supported by blue-colour workers 
which resulted in a general strike on May 13. As a consequence, France came to 
a virtual standstill8. Although the revolt ended quickly, the cultural movement it 
ignited continued in vigour and developed critical perspectives on consumerism, 
sexuality, gender, the typical middle-class family life, environmental 
degradation, third-world famine, colonialism, the cold-war, etc. etc.. After 1968 
France was no longer the same. In addition, new theories of society were needed. 
Social activism and the experience of fast changing institutions and cultural 
values made structuralism look irrelevant. Existentialism lacked a convincing 
social and political theory. Althusser’s Marxism neglected all the differences 
which were not class based (Seidman 1998, p. 220-221). 
Although France was one of the main hot spots of this movement and as we 
will see further below it also invoked a typically French response, this movement 
also spread across many other Western countries. It was against this backdrop 
that human geographers were increasingly dissatisfied and demanded that 
geography come up with a much more relevant contribution to the many social 
problems. Geography should matter! However, ‘[…] geography at the time 
appeared to be populated by practitioners who were constructing models and 
theories in splendid ignorance of the problems of those living in the world 
beyond the “ivory towers” of academia’ (Hubbard et al., 2002, p. 46). In this 
situation, the focus shifted from the pre-given determining material side of 
society to culture as an autonomously shifting and unstable system of meanings 
through which people make sense of the world. Similar to Habermas’ insights, 
culture is not seen as the dependent of economic processes anymore, but as the 
very medium through which social change is experienced, contested and 
constituted (Cosgrove and Jackson, 1987, p. 95 quoted in Hubbard et al., 2002, 
p. 60). Critical geography was not limited to the examination of the role of 
capital in shaping society anymore, but focussed on a whole series of different 
dimensions of power and difference, which are held responsible for all kinds of 
social, economic and spatial differences. In this guise, critical geography 
subordinates the economic to the cultural and the material to the ideal, as well as 
structure to agency. Fragmentation in society, according to Kevin Cox (2002, p. 
7-8), is now assumed to take a different form: ‘The particularities of context, 
7 For more extensive definitions and debates about them, see also the special issue of Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space. Vol. 16, No. 3. 
8 In the United States, these movements found much sympathy and also a general discontent was felt 
but took much more the form of an Anti-Vietnam movement. 
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combined with the will to power, forms the humus for the construction of 
distinct social worlds, for Difference, and the identification of seemingly 
multiple Others to exclude and marginalise’. Exploitation, he continues, as well 
as any practices of exclusion and discursive construction of others, is not seen as 
a necessary feature of capitalism, but as typical features of particular places at 
particular times, depending on the circumstances. As such, critical geography 
lacks a unitary theoretical framework and almost dissolves in the genuine but 
rather non-critical general interest of geographers in processes of spatial 
differentiation. This development coincides with the development of the 
typically French post-structuralist thinking to which I will turn in the following 
section. 
Critical theory in post-modern times 
The development of post-structural theories was directly related to the upsurge in 
the late 1960s in France. As Seidman (2002) convincingly shows the post-
structural thinkers emphasised rebellion and deconstruction rather than social 
construction: ‘Like their activist counterparts on the barricades of the streets of 
Paris, these Parisian intellectuals offered few proposals for a good society 
beyond slogans and rhetoric’ (p. 221). In the same way, it is difficult to identify a 
coherent post-structural theory of society. What is usually designated as post-
structuralism is a rather eclectic collection of theoretical positions, of which most 
authors would not even identify themselves as post-structuralist. Post-
structuralism, as it developed in France, was clearly rooted in French 
structuralism and some would even say that it actually is its consistent extension 
(Frank, 1989; Münker and Roessler, 2000, p. ix). Post-structuralism, for 
example, shares with structuralism a strong anti-humanism. The autonomous, 
rational self is replaced by discursive structures without a subject or agent. In the 
post-structuralist view, it is language which forms individual subjectivity, social 
institutions and the political landscape. Meanings are derived from relations of 
difference and contrast in the dominant discourse. Similar to the classical 
structuralist approach, society is explained by reference to (discursive) structures 
which can not be changed by an agent in a deliberate way. People are thus 
determined by prevailing societal structures9. However, post-structuralist 
thinking clearly differs from the classical structuralist approach in the sense that 
they do not assume a fixed and universal structure to exist. On the contrary, they 
emphasise that discursive structures are inherently unstable, unremittingly on 
drift, and dependent on the specific historical and geographical context10. This 
contingency and subjectivity of discursive structures also makes it highly 
9 Most post-structuralist thinkers, similar to structural-fuctionlist theorists such as Parsons and 
Luhmann, see the subject as vanishing in the self-governing technical and semiotic relational 
networks. In our current media dominated world the subject is lost in the ecstacy of communication 
and is imploding into the masses (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 128). Jameson (1984) characterises the 
subject as fragmented, disjointed and discontinuous, while Deleuze and Guattari (1987) celebrate the 
schizoid, nomadic dispersions and finally the pulverisation of the modern subject. 
10 The post-structuralist thinkers agreed with Saussure (see footnote 3) that meanings are determined 
by relations of difference, but in contrast to structuralism, assume that these meanings are not fixed 
but are in constant flux. 
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political and contested. While in structuralism one would try to discover the 
general social structures, without examining its political implications, in post-
structuralism it is exactly the political dimension of the establishment of 
discursive meanings, which are of central interest. Derrida (1976), for example, 
claimed that ‘whenever a linguistic and social order is said to be fixed or 
meanings are assumed to be unambiguous and stable, this should be understood 
less as a disclosure of truth than as an act of power, the [implicit] capacity of a 
social group to impose its will on others by freezing linguistic and cultural 
meanings’ (Seidman, 2002, p. 222). For example, the way one thought about 
immigration and integration in the 1970s in the Netherlands was not something 
of one’s choosing, but was at that time ‘in the air’ and determined how people 
reacted to foreigners and how integration was institutionalised. Looking back, 
one would now characterise this as the ‘multi-culti’ age. Today, a totally 
different political regime seems to rule, in which immigrants are comparatively 
more marginalised and ‘multi-cultural society’ is seen as a curse (Scheffer, 2000; 
2007). According to post-structural thinkers this is not to be seen as the result of 
a rational process of deliberation but rather as the effect of shifting discursive 
meanings, which determine one’s thinking and doing. The subject, in their view, 
is to be conceptualised as radically de-centred and seems to disappear in 
discursive relations (Zima, 2000). 
Post-structuralism aims not so much at construction of social order, but rather 
at deconstructing seemingly closed patterns of meaning, and linked social 
orderings by uncovering its ambiguities, its contingency and by tracing it back to 
a will for power. As such, this was a strategy of subversion of any kind authority 
and discursive force. On the one hand, it thus carries a strong critical surge. On 
the other hand deconstruction is not a project of reversing the value or position 
of discursively marginalised social groups. It only questions the validity of any 
kind of hierarchy and authority. Derrida e.g. never formulated a social and moral 
vision that could guide the deconstructive project. Deconstruction therefore 
remains a very limited critical strategy as it does not really aim to change 
hierarchical societal structures. This is also the basis of Habermas’ critique of 
post-structuralism. He accuses it of being inherently conservative (Frank, 2005; 
Best and Kellner, 1991, p. 246f; Wolin, 1987) because its lacks any criteria for 
making choices and thus for igniting a transformation of reality. ‘The critical 
spirit of post-structuralism is not joined to a positive liberationist programme’ 
(Saidman ,2002, p. 225). The post-structural project, as Lyotard (1984, p. xxv) 
states, is mainly aimed at disrupting traditional or totalising conceptual meanings 
and conceptual innovation. Its value lies neither in producing liberating truths 
nor socially useful knowledge, but rather in making people more aware of 
differences, ambiguities, uncertainties and conflicts. It therefore ‘refines our 
sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the 
incommensurable’11. Many critical thinkers would say that this is too shallow to 
serve as a critical project which aims at improving the fate of those who are 
oppressed or dominated. The repudiation of humanism by post-structuralist 
11 In this respect, despite the dismissal of the subject, most post-structuralist theory is highly 
subjectivistic. They privilege a subjective politics of performativity, spontaneism and anarchism, 
which fits the events of May 1968 in Paris. They celebrate desire, fragmentation, and libidinal ways 
of being while disqualifying intersubjectivity, reason, social identity, and harmony (Best and Kellner, 
1991, p. 290). 
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thinkers, without reconstructing its core values, strips the subject of any moral 
responsibility and autonomy and makes a moral language in the interest of 
repressed people impossible. Political action then can also not be legitimised 
(Best and Kellner, 1991, p. 291). Of the many post-structuralist thinkers only 
Laclau and Mouffe seem to have attempted to reconstruct a liberal politics, 
although it is uncertain weather their approach strengthens liberal capitalism or 
radical democracy (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). 
In this brief contribution I could not go into more detail although there is much 
more to say on the subject. In general one can conclude that post-structuralism 
has great difficulties in formulating a positive notion of the social, of community 
or solidarity, and post-structuralism also seems to lack an adequate theory of 
agency, of an active creative self, mediated by social institutions, discourses and 
other people (Best and Kellner, 1991, p. 283). This makes it difficult to keep up 
critical attitudes without becoming entangled in all kinds of contradictions 
(Weichhart, 2008). For practical critical geography as far these issues are 
concerned, have hardly seemed to be a real problem which is, as stated in the 
introduction of this contribution, probably due to a lack of reflection and to a 
rather selective-eclectic human geographic praxis (Gelbmann and Mandl, 2002) 
in which not the whole post-structuralist theoretic building is taken on board or 
taken in full-consequence but rather only parts of it as a kind of selective-tool-
box for critical analyses (Gibson-Graham, 2000). This, however, as I have tried 
to show in all its brevity, also leaves many flaws and contradictions which are 
still to be solved. It will be up to our human geography students of the future to 
further explore the possibilities of a deepened debate about the possibilities to 
critically make geography matter and to look for what is next, after post-
structural geography (Dixon and Jones III, 2004) and it will be the task of critical 
geographers such as Ton van Naerssen, to teach them, how to do so. 
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